SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
The Department of Defense broadly defines "stability operations" as "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions." Military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations is defined as "activities that support U.S.
Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests." "Stability operations tasks include helping: rebuild indigenous institutions" such as "security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems…encouraging…bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and developing representative governmental institutions." 2 Stability operations and reconstruction efforts are sometimes described as elements of nation-building. 3 According to James Dobbins, "Nation-building, as it is commonly referred to in the United States, involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors." 4 The military defines Phase IV (Stabilize) operations as follows: In addition to the portions emphasized above, it should be noted that Phase IV is not the only phase in which joint forces conduct "stability operations" and that the transition from one phase to the next is rarely crystal clear. Phase III (Dominate)
operations, generally associated with sustained combat, are conducted to break the enemy's will and control the operational environment. In this phase stability operations are conducted as needed to set conditions for the transition to Phase IV. Phase III operations conclude with decisive operations that drive the adversary to culmination and achieve the JFC's operational objectives. 6 Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) operations are characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater and include the coordination of actions of supporting or supported multinational, agency, and other organizational participants.
The military endstate is achieved in this phase upon completion of redeployment but combatant command involvement with nations or agencies may be required beyond termination of the joint operation to achieve the national strategic endstate. 7 An additional concept frequently interwoven in discussions of Phase IV operations that also merits definition here is "full spectrum operations." The Army states that full spectrum operations consist of offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations. In this context stability and reconstruction operations are described as those operations that "sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. In terms of scope, this paper will address Phase IV operations and their included nation-building activities as opposed to nation-building activities writ large. In the interest of brevity and in consideration of prevalent military usage, these activities will be referred to as Phase IV operations from this point forward.
Why Change the Status Quo?
One needs to look no further than the current situation in Iraq to see there is room for improvement in the U.S. approach to stability operations. The vast majority of U.S.
ground forces have been virtually tied down there for nearly five years with no end in sight. These forces are arguably approaching their breaking point and will require at least $26 billion over two years to reset once they are finally redeployed. 10 As a result the bulk of U.S. ground forces are and will be, for the next several years at a minimum, unavailable for any significant deployment elsewhere during what the Army's senior leadership is referring to as an on-going era of persistent conflict.
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Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has become involved in a new stability operation every two years, each of which typically lasts from five to eight years. 12 As such it is incumbent on the U.S. to find ways to economize on the use of its military forces to ensure they are available to respond to emerging crises. The U.S. has also spent much more on stability operations than on sustained combat operations since the end of the Cold War. 13 Clearly the limited resources the U.S. has to spend on stability operations should be allocated in a manner best suited to accomplishing the mission in the most efficient and expedient manner.
The circumstances in any Phase IV operation are unquestionably difficult and complex and innumerable factors have contributed to U.S. interventions that have been less than successful. There is also no assurance that changes to the U.S. approach to stability operations would have made any of the foregoing experiences appreciably better. But there are some changes to U.S. policy that would seem to improve the odds for success. And it stands to reason that any ability to put civilian stability operations subject matter experts in the place of military forces would at a minimum free those forces for other missions. As mentioned above, even those analysts who cite historical precedence and surrender to the idea that conditions cannot and will not ever change, and thus would have the military wholeheartedly accept the entire stability operations mission, acknowledge that the expertise for many of the tasks resides in other agencies. 14 The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has spurred interest in the area of stability operations and new executive and legislative action has already occurred, but reform is only in its initial stages. The Department of Defense should seek to reinforce and guide these actions as outlined below to establish a permanent, improved construct to its execution of stability operations before "stability fatigue" or the desire for a "peace dividend" at the end of the current conflict precludes positive change from occurring and taking hold. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." 16 The Directive further instructs the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command, to "support interagency requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies to prepare for and conduct stability operations as appropriate…" 17 In its first report to Congress on the implementation of Directive 3000.05 DoD notes that
The greatest challenge to the U.S. Government's ability to conduct SSTR operations is the lack of integrated capability and capacity of civilian agencies with which the military must partner to achieve success. The U.S. Armed Forces can fill some of these gaps in civilian capacity in the short-term, but strategic success will only be possible with (1) The rationale underlying each of these recommendations is outlined in detail below.
Vital Interests and Decisive Force
There is nothing new about the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines of restricting involvement in conflicts to those vital to our national interests and using decisive force to win them. 29 But they are so fundamental to ultimate success in Phase IV that one would be remiss not to mention them. It must also be acknowledged that the two administrations responsible for deploying military forces more frequently than ever before in the history of the United States rather pointedly rejected these doctrines. 30 Clearly DoD is not the ultimate "decider" when it comes to determining where and when military forces will be deployed. 31 Even so, DoD does wield significant sway in the decision-making process. Even the richest nation in history cannot deploy its military to address all the problems of a world experiencing an "era of persistent conflict." U.S.
resources will always be limited and the U.S. must expand its use of the diplomatic and economic instruments of national power to engage a greater portion of the world's problems. The fact that the U.S. military has experienced far more frequent deployments since the end of the Cold War does not mean this must continue to be the case in the future.
Given the U.S. military's supremacy in sustained combat against any current or currently projected adversary, the key to exploiting decisive force is ensuring it is in place at the onset of Phase IV operations. The military can become a victim of its own success when limited forces quickly prevail in sustained combat operations before sufficient forces can be amassed to establish and maintain security in Phase IV. The inability to prevent looting and a breakdown of law and order at the "golden hour" when the tide has turned and major combat operations cease runs the risk of emboldening those who would continue to oppose U.S. presence. 32 At this crucial point, while the local population is disorganized and resistors are off-balance, the U.S. must have, at a minimum, sufficient forces and supplies on hand to totally secure and meet the immediate needs of the country's capital region. 33 If the capital city cannot be rapidly brought under both control and visible order, whatever local and global credibility and legitimacy the U.S. possessed at the onset of the intervention will quickly erode. 34 While such erosion at the local level can serve to bolster the confidence of potential opposition forces, globally it can undermine both domestic and coalition will to see Phase IV efforts through to completion. Ideally military forces should be accompanied by civil administrators, humanitarian organizations, judicial and penal experts, and sufficient funding and resources to begin the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants and the retraining of the police force at this critical time. 35 To determine the size of the forces required for Phase IV operations, one must consider the size of the population and the level of security and control within the state. 36 The higher the level of residual violence and criminality, the higher the ratio of troops to population required. 37 Recent Phase IV successes in Bosnia and Kosovo, states with less post-major combat hostilities than Iraq, were accomplished with relatively high force ratios of 19 and 20 soldiers per 1,000 of population, respectively. forces, and provide the intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities required for counterinsurgency operations to the small-unit level. 41 When security and control are established a fundamental redistribution of power can occur through rapid and thorough reforms that keep the powerful and entrenched elements of the previous governing authority at bay. 42 The larger the force at the onset of Phase IV operations, the faster indigenous institutions can be reconstituted and the earlier military forces can be redeployed, reset, and made ready to execute the next operation.
Other implications of employing such an enormous force merit consideration as well. First, the requirement for a decisive force for Phase IV reinforces the idea that the U.S. should only deploy its forces when its vital interests are at stake. Second, the U.S.
should resist unilateral interventions and assemble a larger international coalition to undertake future efforts on the scale of the regime change in Iraq. Third, the logistical realities of amassing such a force impede the speed with which the U.S. can employ its military power around the world. Finally, decision-makers should pause before considering any attempt at conducting Phase IV operations in a country the size of Iran with a population of over 65 million. 43 The DoD Science Board summarizes this point in its 2004 study on Transition to and from Hostilities:
…the military services have learned -sometimes through bitter experience -that shortchanging combat capability is much more expensive than providing the needed resources in the first place. However, this lesson has yet to be learned in the context of stabilization and reconstruction operations. provide implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans, develop a process to share planning information with non-DoD agencies early in the planning process as appropriate, and orient DoD and non-DoD personnel in each agency's planning processes and capabilities.
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Any attempt to integrate activities across elements as diverse as those of the U.S.
interagency will be faced with considerable challenges and subject to the political whims and personalities of those appointed or elected to office in the future. DoD can catalyze this process by encouraging regular civilian agency participation in its planning and exercises. 46 Additionally, while the issue is at the forefront of the minds of its executors, DoD and DoS should formalize their processes for ensuring interagency integration in policy-level directives. Such codification is critical to the permanent establishment and realization of the benefits of interagency integration over the long term.
Resourcing DoS
Since the publication of NSPD-44, funding for S/CRS and its stability operations initiatives has grown slowly, from $12. each year from DoD for services, materiel, and SSTR-related assistance. 48 In effect, the DoD transfer funded the Conflict Response Fund, which is to be used to prevent future conflicts and pay for crisis response planning and transition activities in the first four months of an intervention.
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Clearly the S/CRS will require additional funding if it is to have the ability to plan, train, and staff a deployable cadre sufficient to fulfill the role assigned to it in NSPD-44.
Even though Congress made clear the transfer of DoD funds was a temporary move, stakeholders believe future increases in S/CRS funding will come at the expense of decreases in DoD funding. 50 Former S/CRS director Carlos Pascual acknowledged the multi-million dollar sum required is "a huge number in the civilian budget.
[But] a tiny number when you think about the broad issues that are at stake." 51 Senator Richard
Lugar, whose bill established S/CRS, believes the proposed deployable civilian corps would be a "force multiplier…with the authority and training to take broad operational responsibility for stability missions." Forces-Iraq operated from separate headquarters and issued separate orders that often conflicted. 57 Similarly, in Somalia, there were at one point three separate command arrangements, which resulted in at least one organization being unaware of what the others were doing. 58 In complex Phase IV operations, "unity of command" has been replaced by "unity of effort" due to the political sensitivities of putting one cabinet department's senior leader in charge of another cabinet department. 59 This resistance must be overcome in order to reconcile the political ends with the military and civilian means so that clear attainable objectives based on a sound political vision can emerge. This can best occur when all lines of authority lead unambiguously to a single headquarters that uses combined civilian and military expertise to act as a clearing-house for decisions. 60 Stakeholders in this process have expressed strong agreement, so far in principle, that civilian agencies should lead SSTR planning and execution before and after major combat operations and that the transition to civilian leadership should occur as rapidly as possible. 61 For the sake of continuity, foreign area expertise, and keeping turbulence to a minimum, the chief of mission, if present, should be the first choice to assume the civilian lead.
The Role of the Military in Phase IV Operations NSPD-44 established the S/CRS as the lead for U.S. stability operations and created the Post Conflict ETM of individual tasks that as a whole can facilitate a country's transition from armed conflict to sustainable stability. The ETM does not assign tasks nor does it convey that the capability to carry them out currently exists in the U.S. government, but it is a compilation of what is thought to be required to be successful in Phase IV operations by several subject matter experts. As such it is a "living document" subject to change based on future lessons learned. The ETM's greatest utility is in its imposition of a common language and set of missions all stakeholders can utilize to delineate roles and responsibilities in Phase IV operations. 62 The establishment of security and control in a country emerging from conflict is the foundation upon which all other Phase IV operations rest and is clearly the sole province of the military. 63 At the same time, history has shown that the establishment of security is the most difficult task to achieve in the post-major combat environment. For these reasons, when the military prepares for the stability and reconstruction portion of its full spectrum operations it should focus on the security tasks of the ETM and support the other sectors only in a secondary role. DoD recognized this in its report to Nonetheless, the military should orient itself and its limited training time and resources primarily to those tasks in the security sector.
Other reasons the military should maintain a security-focused orientation include the resulting incentive for other agencies to increase their capabilities and the reduction of problems with humanitarian operations. Inasmuch as the incentive for Iraqi and Afghani indigenous forces to take charge of their own security is retarded by the continued presence of U.S. forces, so too can civilian agencies be disinclined to make their personnel and resources available for stability exercises and operations when the military continues to shoulder the load. 66 An announcement of a DoD policy to retain exclusive responsibility for the security sector while assisting civilian agencies down a clear path to becoming fully capable of assuming the Governance and Participation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, and Justice and Reconciliation sector tasks would provide better encouragement to those agencies than acceding to the previous status quo.
Conclusion
The U.S. military goes to great lengths to anticipate, plan for, and transform itself to address change in a constant effort to remain "relevant and ready" to defeat any threat to national security. In order to "achieve the national strategic endstate" in an armed conflict in a timely and efficient manner that permits the utmost flexibility and availability of the national elements of power, the U.S. must pursue opportunities to maximize its efficiency and economize on the use of its forces. The current situation in
Iraq has opened a window of opportunity for the establishment of full and genuine civilian agency participation in Phase IV operations, the most time consuming and expensive part of military interventions. To fully exploit the opportunities for success in future Phase IV operations the U.S. government must restrict U.S. military involvement to those conflicts absolutely vital to national security, ensure decisive force is in place at the onset of Phase IV operations, fully integrate the interagency at the onset of its planning for an intervention, ensure full funding of S/CRS initiatives, reestablish true unity of command for each phase of the operation, and allow the military to focus on the security sector of stabilization and reconstruction tasks. Taken together, these actions will allow the military to successfully transition from the sustained combat operations of Phase III through the stability operations of Phase IV to redeployment in the most timely manner possible in order to be better ready to take on the challenges of this era of persistent conflict. More importantly, implementation of these actions will posture the U.S. government as a whole to more effectively and efficiently execute stability and
